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TURNING OVER STONES: ADVOCATING FOR STRONGER
REPORTING REQUIREMENTS FOR OPPORTUNITY ZONES
ABSTRACT
In 2017, Congress passed Sections 1400Z-1 and 1400Z-2 into the Internal
Revenue Code, effectively codifying new tax legislation dubbed ‘Opportunity
Zones.’ This legislation, which received bipartisan support, was meant to
provide investors with a tax break to incentivize investment in low-income
communities. The Opportunity Zone program is a substantial tax expenditure
for Congress, and one that proponents believe can attract investment into parts
of the United States suffering from diminutive economic growth. However,
critics doubt this program will benefit those living in distressed communities,
and fear that Opportunity Zones will instead promote gentrification while giving
wealthy investors unnecessary tax breaks.
It is unclear which side of the argument is correct because specific, detailed
data illustrating the effectiveness of Opportunity Zones simply isn’t available.
This Note will address why data collection is currently limited and proposes a
solution at gathering more specific data to determine if Opportunity Zones truly
benefit residents of low-income communities.
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INTRODUCTION
In the book Moneyball: The Art of Winning an Unfair Game, author Michael
Lewis tells the true story of how the Oakland Athletics baseball team used data
to gain a competitive advantage in the early 2000s despite having one of the
lowest payrolls in baseball. 1 Lewis quotes John Henry, the former owner of the
Florida Marlins baseball team who made a fortune in financial markets, on how
data collection serves as a valuable tool in both baseball and finance. 2 Henry
said, “People in both fields operate with beliefs and biases. To the extent you
can eliminate both and replace them with data you gain a clear advantage.” 3
Republicans and Democrats, conservatives and liberals, and other leaders in
government form policy ideas based partly upon how they see the world. 4
Political leaders may dispute whether they think a policy is smart or worthwhile,
but once that policy is passed through Congress, there must be a system in place
to objectively measure whether that policy is a winner or a loser, like a baseball
team or a stock. Unfortunately, this is not always the case.
In 2017, the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act passed a tax incentive known as
Opportunity Zones (“OZs”). 5 This tax incentive was introduced with bipartisan
support and was created to help spur investment in low-income communities. 6
However, those using the tax incentive are not required to report much data at
all, and for reasons that will be discussed, these programs are difficult to
monitor. Worse yet, skeptics such as Congresswoman Rashida Tlaib believe
wealthy developers are using OZs to exploit low-income communities. 7
In Part I, this Note will discuss the history of Opportunity Zones, and the
social benefit that the program was meant to provide. “Social benefit” will be
used in this Note to describe broadly any positive impact that OZ investment
might have on individuals living in low-income communities, including
increased employment, improved living conditions, better access to health care,
higher wages, and more. The Note will also explain the statutory requirements
of the program, and Part II will discuss support for and criticisms of OZs. Part
III will explore the difficulty in monitoring whether OZs benefit low-income
communities. Last, Part IV will propose a method to collect industry-specific,
1. See generally MICHAEL LEWIS, MONEYBALL: THE ART OF WINNING AN UNFAIR GAME
(2004).
2. Id. at 90.
3. Id. at 90–91.
4. Sheheryar Banuri et al., Biased Policy Professionals, 33 WORLD BANK ECON. REV. 310,
311 (2019), https://doi.org/10.1093/wber/lhy033.
5. I.R.C. § 1400Z (2018).
6. Stan Veuger, ‘Opportunity Zones’ don’t actually work, AMER. ENTER. INST. (Sept. 4,
2020), https://www.aei.org/articles/opportunity-zones-dont-actually-work/.
7. Press Release, Rep. Rashida Tlaib, Congresswoman Rashida Tlaib Introduces Bill to
Repeal Controversial Opportunity Zones (Nov. 22, 2019), https://tlaib.house.gov/media/press-re
leases/congresswoman-rashida-tlaib-introduces-bill-repeal-controversial-opportunity.
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standardized data to help measure social benefit, and will suggest an
authoritative body to collect, analyze, and publish this data.
I. HISTORY OF OPPORTUNITY ZONES
A.

Legislative History

Opportunity Zones are the newest in a line of place-based tax incentives,
preceded most notably by the New Markets Tax Credit and the Low-Income
Housing Tax Credit. 8 Professor Michelle Layser of the University of Illinois, an
expert in tax law, defines a “place-based incentive” as a tax expenditure used to
drive investment to low-income areas. 9 A “tax expenditure” is not actually an
expense paid by the federal government, but is foregone tax revenue attributable
to a provision in the Internal Revenue Code (“the Code”) that provides a tax
credit, exclusion, deferral, or some other benefit to taxpayers. 10 “Place-based”
incentives are tax expenditures that provide a tax benefit to taxpayers who invest
within a specific geographic area, often times in “entrenched pockets of
poverty.” 11 They have become popular amongst lawmakers partly because they
present a palatable alternative to direct welfare spending, which is often an
unpopular political strategy. 12
The initial Opportunity Zone model was created by Jared Bernstein and
Kevin Hassett in a 2015 white paper published by the Economic Innovation
Group (“EIG”), 13 a Washington think tank led by former tech mogul Sean
Parker. 14 Hassett grew up in a part of Massachusetts that had struggled
economically and wanted to help spur development in these types of distressed
communities. 15 Hassett was not paid for his work, motivated instead by a desire
to help those in struggling communities. 16
8. Michelle D. Layser, The Pro-Gentrification Origins of Place-Based Investment Tax
Incentives and a Path Toward Community Oriented Reform, 2019 WIS. L. REV. 745, 762, 788
(2019) [hereinafter Pro-Gentrification Origins].
9. Michelle D. Layser, How Place-Based Tax Incentives Can Reduce Geographic Inequality
3–4 (U. Ill. Tax L. Rev., Research Paper No. 20-09), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3516469 (last
updated Oct. 23, 2020) [hereinafter Place-Based Tax Incentives].
10. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-21-30, IMPROVED OVERSIGHT NEEDED TO
EVALUATE TAX EXPENDITURE PERFORMANCE 1 (2020), https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-21-30
[hereinafter IMPROVED OVERSIGHT NEEDED].
11. Place-Based Tax Incentives, supra note 9, at 4.
12. Id. at 11–12.
13. Rachel M.B. Atkins et al., What is the Impact of Opportunity Zones on Employment
Outcomes?, 3 NYU STERN SCH. OF BUS. (Sept. 18, 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3673986.
14. Jim Tankersley, Tucked Into the Tax Bill, a Plan to Help Distressed America, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 29, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/29/business/tax-bill-economic-recovery-oppor
tunity-zones.html.
15. Id.
16. Id.
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Parker was interested in this project as a way to address rural America’s
struggle to recover from the Great Recession, as disproportionate shares of
economic growth focused in large metropolitan areas. 17 For context, before
2010, metropolitan areas with at least one million residents provided just under
half of America’s jobs, but from 2010 to 2016, that number jumped to threequarters of net job creation. 18 Meanwhile, rural areas only experienced three
percent growth. 19 According to John Lettieri, President and CEO of EIG, the
“deeply uneven” economic recovery from the Great Recession prompted the
development of Opportunity Zones. 20 These Zones, according to Lettieri, “are
the most innovative and ambitious federal attempt to encourage long-term
private investment in low-income communities in at least a generation.” 21
After theorizing the Opportunity Zone program, EIG got involved in
developing the Investing in Opportunity Act (“IIOA”) bill. 22 EIG worked
closely with Republican Senator Tim Scott and Democratic Senator Cory
Booker, who became the lead sponsors of the IIOA. 23 This bill garnered
bipartisan support and was included in the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, and is now
referred to as the Opportunity Zones provision. 24 Senator Scott, who grew up in
a community that struggled economically, 25 claimed that Opportunity Zones
would help “create a spark” in some of the most distressed communities in
America. 26
B.

Statutory Requirements

Opportunity Zones are codified in Sections 1400Z-1 and 1400Z-2 of the
Code. 27 A Qualified Opportunity Zone (“QOZ”) is a population census tract that
the governor of the relevant state nominates as such. 28 Such a nomination must
then be certified by the Secretary of the Treasury. 29 To be eligible for
nomination, a census tract must be a “low-income community.” 30 A tract with a
poverty rate of at least twenty percent will qualify as a low-income
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Tankersley, supra note 14.
20. Expanding Opportunities for Small Businesses Through the Tax Code: Hearing Before the
Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship, 115th Cong. 14 (2018) (statement of John
Lettieri, President & CEO, Economic Innovation Group).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Tankersley, supra note 14.
26. 163 Cong. Rec. S8205-06 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 2017) (statement of Sen. Scott).
27. I.R.C. § 1400Z-1 (2018); 26 U.S.C. § 1400Z-2 (2018).
28. I.R.C. § 1400Z-1(a) (2018).
29. I.R.C. § 1400Z-1(b)(1)(B) (2018).
30. I.R.C. § 1400Z-1(b)(1) (2018).
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community. 31 Alternatively, a tract with a median income below eighty percent
of the statewide median income will qualify, if that tract is not in a metropolitan
area. 32 Tracts in a metropolitan area may qualify if their median income is below
eighty percent of either statewide or metropolitan median income, whichever is
greater. 33 If none of these conditions are met, a tract may nevertheless qualify if
it is contiguous with a census tract meeting one of the above conditions and has
a median income less than 125% of the qualifying, neighboring census tract. 34
Tax breaks are provided to investors of Qualified Opportunity Funds
(“QOFs”). 35 QOFs are investment vehicles organized as a corporation or
partnership for the purpose of investing in Qualified Opportunity Zone
property. 36 This property may simply be qualified business property or may be
a stock or partnership interest in entities that own qualified business property. 37
Generally, qualified business property is new or substantially improved tangible
property, such as a building. 38
QOFs must have at least ninety percent of assets invested in QOZ property. 39
However, there is no application or approval process for an entity to become a
QOF. 40 Rather, the entity simply must file two tax forms, 8996 and 8997, with
their annual income tax return. 41 Meanwhile, individuals invested in these QOFs
claim deferrals on capital gains by reporting them on Form 8949, where sales
and dispositions of capital assets are recorded by taxpayers every year. 42
Tax breaks for QOF investors are better the longer the investment is held. 43
Investors may place existing capital assets with unrealized capital gains into
Opportunity Funds, and these gains will not be taxed until 2026 or until they are
disposed. 44 Additionally, investors can step up the basis on their original
investment by ten percent if the capital gains are placed in Opportunity Funds

31. I.R.C. § 45D(e)(1)(A) (2018).
32. I.R.C. § 45D(e)(1)(B)(i) (2018).
33. I.R.C. § 45D(e)(1)(B)(ii) (2018).
34. I.R.C. § 1400Z-1(e) (2018).
35. I.R.C. § 1400Z-2(d)(1) (2018).
36. Id.
37. I.R.C. § 1400Z-2(d)(2) (2018).
38. JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, QUALIFIED OPPORTUNITY ZONES: AN OVERVIEW 22,
41 (2019), https://www.jct.gov/publications/2019/qualified-opportunity-zones-an-overview/
[hereinafter AN OVERVIEW].
39. I.R.C. § 1400Z-2(d)(1) (2018).
40. AN OVERVIEW, supra note 38, at 20.
41. IMPROVED OVERSIGHT NEEDED, supra note 10, at 15.
42. Instructions for Form 8949, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pedf/i8949 (last updated
Jan. 26, 2021); see also Form 8949, IRS (2020), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f8949.pdf.
43. Tax Pol’y Ctr., What are Opportunity Zones and how do they work?, URBAN INST. &
BROOKINGS INST., https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/what-are-opportunity-zonesand-how-do-they-work (last updated May 2020) [hereinafter What are Opportunity Zones].
44. I.R.C. § 1400Z-2(a)(2) (2018); What are Opportunity Zones, supra note 43.
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for at least five years, and fifteen percent if the investment lasts for at least seven
years. 45 Last, investors can fully exclude taxes on capital gains produced through
their investment in Opportunity Funds when that investment is held for at least
ten years by stepping the basis of the property up to fair market value. 46
II. SUPPORT & CRITICISM
Despite initial bipartisan support, Opportunity Zones have become a topic
of political debate. Former President Trump touted the tax incentives as one of
his biggest successes and planned to expand the program in a second term, were
he to beat President Joe Biden. 47 However, critics such as Congresswoman
Rashida Tlaib, who introduced legislation in 2019 to repeal OZs from the Code,
feel that the provision represents “yet another form of corporate greed” that hurts
communities. 48
A.

Proponents: An Improvement over Prior Place-Based Tax Incentives

Former President Trump and other proponents of Opportunity Zones believe
this tax provision will help communities experiencing slow economic growth. 49
The “spatial mismatch” theory advanced by some OZ supporters argues that,
because people can become trapped in low-income areas, offering place-based
incentives directly to these geographical areas can help draw investment and job
opportunities to these people. 50 Others argue that attracting highly skilled people
to productive urban centers may generate benefits that will then “spill over” to
other areas of that local economy. 51
Proponents also see Opportunity Zones as an improvement over older placebased incentives. The place-based incentive most often compared to
Opportunity Zones is the New Markets Tax Credit (“NMTC”), introduced in
2000 to subsidize financing projects located in poor neighborhoods. 52 The
program operates through businesses or partnerships called Community
Development Entities (“CDEs”), which apply to the U.S. Treasury Department’s
45. I.R.C. § 1400Z-2(b)(2)(B) (2018); What are Opportunity Zones, supra note 43.
46. I.R.C. § 1400Z-2(c) (2018); What are Opportunity Zones, supra note 43.
47. Lydia O’Neal, Opportunity Zones Get Big Push as Critics Question Who They Help,
BLOOMBERG TAX (Sept. 8, 2020), https://news.bloombergtax.com/daily-tax-report/opportunityzones-get-big-push-as-critics-question-who-they-help.
48. Tlaib, supra note 7.
49. John P. Bailey, Why ‘Opportunity Zones’ could solve unemployment in slow growth areas,
AMER. ENTER. INST. (Apr. 6, 2018), https://www.aei.org/articles/why-opportunity-zones-couldsolve-unemployment-in-slow-growth-areas/.
50. Scott Eastman & Nicole Kaeding, Opportunity Zones: What We Know and What We
Don’t, 630 TAX FOUND. 1, 7 (Jan. 2019), https://taxfoundation.org/opportunity-zones-what-weknow-and-what-we-dont/.
51. Id.
52. I.R.C. § 45D(a)(1); The Pro-Gentrification Origins, supra note 8, at 787.
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Community Development Financial Institutions (“CDFI”) Fund to receive
federal tax credits. 53 For a CDE to receive tax credits, the CDE must be certified
by the Secretary of the Treasury, and must have a primary mission of serving or
providing investment capital for low-income communities. 54 Further, there must
be residents of the low-income community on any governing or advisory board
the CDE has. 55
Once the CDFI Fund awards tax credits to CDEs, the CDEs will sell them
to investors and use the funds to make investments in low-income
communities. 56 Investors in a qualified CDE can claim a tax credit for five
percent of their investment for the first three years, and six percent of the
investment for the remaining four years after that. 57 In total, this means investors
can receive a tax credit for up to thirty-nine percent of the NMTC project. 58
The White House Council of Economic Advisers (“CEA”) touts several
advantages of Opportunity Zones over New Markets Tax Credits from the
perspective of the investor. 59 First, the total tax benefit available through
NMTCs is capped at thirty-nine percent, whereas investors in OZs can fully
exclude capital gains invested for longer than ten years. 60 Additionally, while
the application process for NMTCs is complex, Opportunity Zone tax
deductions give less sophisticated investors a chance to receive a tax benefit for
investing in low-income communities. 61 Last, OZ restrictions are generally less
strict than NMTC’s restrictions, where the investor will lose their entire tax
benefit if funds are not invested in CDEs for at least seven years, or are not
compliant with program requirements. 62
Opportunity Zones also allow for more investing opportunities than the
Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (“LIHTC”). LIHTCs, born in the Tax Reform
Act of 1986, 63 provide tax incentives for developing and rehabilitating

53. URBAN INST., ANALYSIS OF SELECTED NEW MARKETS TAX CREDIT PROJECTS 1–2
(2007).
54. I.R.C. § 45D(c)(1)(A) (2018).
55. I.R.C. § 45D(c)(1)(B) (2018).
56. Tax Pol’y Ctr., What is the new markets tax credit, and how does it work?, URB. INST. &
BROOKINGS INST., https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/what-new-markets-tax-creditand-how-does-it-work (last updated Jan. 2021) [hereinafter What is the New Markets Tax Credit].
57. I.R.C. § 45D(a)(2)–(3).
58. What is the New Markets Tax Credit, supra note 56.
59. COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, THE IMPACT OF OPPORTUNITY ZONES: AN INITIAL
ASSESSMENT 6 (2020).
60. Id.; What are Opportunity Zones, supra note 43.
61. See COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, supra note 59, at 7.
62. Id.
63. MARK P. KEIGHTLEY, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RS22389, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LOWINCOME HOUSING TAX CREDIT 1 (2019).
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affordable rental housing for low-income households. 64 The federal government
issues tax credits to state and territorial governments, who then distribute these
credits to state housing finance agencies (“HFAs”). 65 Then, HFAs award the tax
credits to private developers of affordable rental housing projects. 66
While LIHTCs are focused exclusively on affordable housing projects, OZs
can be used to support investment in any type of tangible asset class located
within an OZ. 67 Additionally, as is the case with NMTCs, there are statutory
limits on the dollar amounts of LIHTCs allocated by the government every
year. 68 Contrarily, there are no restrictions on how many capital gains investors
can defer by investing in QOFs. 69
B.

Opponents: A Trickle-Down Policy Designed for the Wealthy

Nevertheless, the Opportunity Zones program has received a great deal of
skepticism. One of the primary concerns is that QOF projects are not required to
hire, provide job training, or even provide services to those living in QOZs. 70
This may lead to developments funded within OZs that do little to “create a
spark” for low-income communities. For instance, a census tract in Portland,
Oregon, is listed as an Opportunity Zone because nearly half of its residents are
considered poor. 71 However, a Ritz-Carlton hotel and “the most expensive
condos that Portland has yet seen” are under construction there, incentivized by
OZs and other tax breaks. 72 Another example is a superyacht marina in MiamiFort Lauderdale under construction in an OZ tract with a median income under
eighty percent. 73 Whether these types of luxury developments will help benefit
the OZs’ poor residents is questionable. 74
In fact, these types of projects suggest that Opportunity Zones promote
gentrification. 75 Gentrification has rarely been a stated goal of government
because most consider it to be an “unintended, regrettable” consequence of
policy. 76 With little restriction on the types of eligible projects, however,
64. I.R.C. § 42; Tax Pol’y Ctr., What is the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit and how does it
work?, URB. INST. & BROOKINGS INST., https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/what-lowincome-housing-tax-credit-and-how-does-it-work (last updated May 2020) [hereinafter What is the
Low-Income Housing Tax Credit].
65. What is the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit, supra note 64.
66. Id.
67. IMPROVED OVERSIGHT NEEDED, supra note 10, at 9.
68. Id. at 10.
69. Id.
70. Pro-Gentrification Origins, supra note 8, at 770.
71. Calvin H. Johnson, Repeal Opportunity Zones, 169 TAX NOTES FED. 625, 627 (2020).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Pro-Gentrification Origins, supra note 8, at 769–71.
76. Id. at 772.
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investors will receive tax breaks to build movie theatres, art centers, hotels,
luxury housing, and commercial buildings. 77 Thus, this tax provision might
simply be encouraging the transformation of a space used by poor residents into
a space to be used by the wealthy. 78
Another major concern is the requirements for tracts to be eligible as QOZs.
Since poverty rates of census tracts determine eligibility, some census tracts may
contain both low-income and high-income communities and nevertheless
qualify. 79 Furthermore, the Code allows some census tracts bordering qualifying
tracts to also qualify, when these tracts might not need economic assistance. 80
For instance, in 2018 Amazon’s proposed location for its second
headquarters in Long Island City, New York, was eligible as a “contiguous
tract,” despite Queens County having a median household income of
approximately $62,000, a 20.5% Black/African-American population and 28%
Hispanic or Latino population. 81 For comparison, the U.S. Census estimates that
the median household income in New York City from 2015 to 2019 was
$63,998, with a 24.3% Black or African American population and a 29.1%
Hispanic or Latino population. 82 While slightly below the New York City
average, this tract is likely not struggling from the “deeply uneven” economic
growth following the Great Recession. Furthermore, Amazon’s proposal
happened as Queens lost 22,700 Black homeowners between 2005 and 2017,
partly due to rapidly increasing housing prices. 83
Another concern is that policymakers are simply folding OZ tax breaks into
existing development strategies rather than creating new opportunities for lowincome communities. 84 OZ incentives can be combined with New Markets Tax
Credits to attract more financing to existing projects. 85 Thus, OZ incentives may
be claimed through investments that would have happened regardless. 86
The structure of the Opportunity Zones provision, as well as the projects
underway in cities like Portland, New York, and Miami, suggest that
Opportunity Zones are not working to uplift areas outside of major markets
struggling to recover from the Recession, or even improving lives of those in
low-income metropolitan areas. Instead, these projects seem more readily built
77. Id. at 769; see also Johnson, supra note 71, at 625.
78. Pro-Gentrification Origins, supra note 8, at 760.
79. Veuger, supra note 6.
80. Id.
81. Bre Jordan, Denouncing the Myth of Place-Based Subsidies as the Solution for
Economically Distressed Communities: An Analysis of Opportunity Zones as a Subsidy for LowIncome Displacement, 10 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 66, 96–97 (2020).
82. QUICKFACTS NEW YORK CITY, NEW YORK, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census
.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/newyorkcitynewyork/PST045219 (last visited Feb. 17, 2021).
83. Jordan, supra note 81, at 97.
84. Veuger, supra note 6.
85. Pro-Gentrification Origins, supra note 8, at 770.
86. Veuger, supra note 6.
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to provide wealthy investors with tax breaks in a “longshot” effort to encourage
trickle-down benefits to low-income areas. 87 Given this concern, more research
must be done to demonstrate why Opportunity Zones and other place-based
incentives should not be abandoned in favor of direct grants to low-income
individuals. 88
III. A LACK OF DATA FOR SOCIAL BENEFITS
As currently constructed, Opportunity Zones suffer from a lack of
reasonable reporting requirements to measure social benefits of the program.
However, the need for expanded data collection measuring the economic activity
of OZs is generally agreed upon. 89 In fact, both Senator Scott and House
Majority Whip James Clyburn have introduced bills recommending changes in
reporting protocol for Opportunity Zones. 90 For proponents, better reporting
requirements could help prove that Opportunity Zones are making a big impact
on low-income neighborhoods. For skeptics, improved data collection could
highlight concerns that OZs are not actually helping low-income communities.
A.

Qualified Opportunity Funds Do Not Collect or Report Useful Data

Thus far, data collection for Opportunity Zones is scant. To file as a QOF,
entities must complete Form 8996. 91 On that form, the corporation or partnership
filing must list the QOZ tract that it is holding its investment in. 92 The entity
must also report the total value of its stock or partnership interest, owned
property value, and leased property value. 93 Further, on Form 8997, QOFs must
also file initial and then annual statements listing each QOF investment along
with the amount of short and long-term capital gains deferred. 94 Meanwhile,
individuals claiming a deduction via QOF investment need only list on Form
8949 the employer identification number (“EIN”) of the QOF fund, the amount
of their QOF investment, and the amount of gain deferred. 95

87. Jordan, supra note 81, at 87; see also Tatiana Kimbo & Richard Phillips, How Opportunity
Zones Benefit Investors and Promote Displacement, JUST TAXES BLOG (Aug. 10, 2018), https://itep
.org/how-opportunity-zones-benefit-investors-and-promote-displacement/ (last visited Dec. 28,
2020) (“In fact, additional investment driven by opportunity zones could have the unintended effect
of fueling higher real estate prices that serve to displace low-income citizens and businesses rather
than benefit them.”).
88. Place-Based Tax Incentives, supra note 9, at 12.
89. O’Neal, supra note 47.
90. H.R. 5042, 116th Cong. § 7 (2019); S. 1344, 116th Cong. § 1 (2019).
91. AN OVERVIEW, supra note 38, at 20.
92. Form 8996, IRS (2020), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f8996.pdf.
93. Id.
94. IMPROVED OVERSIGHT NEEDED, supra note 10, at 15 tbl.1; Form 8997, IRS (2020),
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f8997.pdf.
95. Instructions for Form 8949, supra note 42.
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The Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) alone administers Opportunity Zones
and does not monitor performance of OZs in any way beyond tax compliance. 96
The IRS considers its role as limited to administering the tax code and ensuring
taxpayer compliance and believes that it should seek to do so efficiently. 97 Thus,
the IRS has no plan to collect any additional information beyond information on
tax forms. 98 The agency is currently uninterested in collecting information
related to policy goals, outcomes of the investments, or most importantly, impact
on low-income communities. 99
Even useful information that the IRS currently collects is not publicly
available, at least in the short term. 100 Complete tax data from individuals is
generally not available until eighteen months after the end of a tax year. 101
Further, some data from tax forms 8996 and 8997 may not be captured in an
easily accessible format, creating challenges for use in analysis. 102 Data
collected by the IRS might also be permanently protected by taxpayer privacy
safeguards, meaning that any performance evaluation done on OZs may not be
available publicly. 103
Outside of data collected by the IRS, data collected by the Census Bureau
may be helpful because OZs are based on census tracts. 104 The Council of
Economic Advisers, for example, found that census tracts selected as OZs
currently have an average poverty rate more than double of other census tracts
and a higher rate of high school dropouts. 105 Theoretically, changes over time in
census tract demographics such as employment rate, poverty rate, and education
level could demonstrate the benefit of the OZ program. 106 However, without any
way to directly track where QOFs are investing, and what they are investing in,
the usefulness of this data is limited. 107 For instance, researchers might look at
increased median incomes in the area over time as a measure of success, but this
may instead represent new residents moving in and old residents moving out. 108

96. IMPROVED OVERSIGHT NEEDED, supra note 10, at 11, 13.
97. Id. at 13.
98. Id.
99. See id.
100. Id. at 16.
101. IMPROVED OVERSIGHT NEEDED, supra note 10, at 16.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Daniel Marcin, Opportunity Zones: A Place-Based Incentive for Investment in LowIncome Communities, 22 CITYSCAPE 101, 107 (U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urb. Dev. 2020),
https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/26926898.
105. COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, supra note 59, at 11.
106. See id. at 23 (measuring the “year-over-year” change in average sale price of OZ
properties).
107. IMPROVED OVERSIGHT NEEDED, supra note 10, at 18.
108. Marcin, supra note 104, at 108.
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What also makes tracking effectiveness complex is that OZs may not be the
only incentive an investor uses. For example, OZ and NMTC credits use the
same statutory criteria to identify low-income community census tracts, 109 and
both credits may be used on the same project. This makes it difficult to isolate
the effects of one program relative to a mix of programs. 110
Even with more data, comparing QOFs in various QOZs will be difficult
without standardizing data. QOZs were designated by governors, who were
generally able to designate twenty-five percent of eligible tracts in their state as
QOZs. 111 As long as the tracts qualified under the Code, governors did not have
to follow a specific set of criteria when designating tracts. 112 So, some governors
may have chosen to nominate tracts in already improving areas, while others
focused on truly impoverished areas. 113 This lack of standardization makes it
much harder to compare QOZs to one another and will “confound simplistic
attempts at evaluation.” 114 It also impairs the ability for analysts to use a
“counterfactual” to compare eligible tracts that did receive the QOZ designation
to those that did not. 115
Given the lack of useful available information, research done on OZs thus
far has struggled to measure the impact on residents in OZ tracts. For instance,
the White House Council of Economic Advisers estimated that, at the end of
2019, QOFs raised $75 billion in private capital, $52 billion of which was new
investment. 116 It suggests this capital investment explains why private equity
investment in OZ businesses grew twenty-nine percent, relative to eligible
communities not selected as OZs. 117 The council also estimated a 1.1% increase
in housing values in OZ tract areas. 118
However, the CEA also found that almost half of QOFs were focused on
real estate, with the majority focusing on commercial real estate. 119 Almost the
entire other half of QOFs described their industry, vaguely, as a “Pooled
Investment Fund” with investments across industries. 120 Only nine percent of
QOFs reported a focus on health care, technology, construction, and
investment. 121 Whether these commercial real estate or “pooled investment
funds” are committed to hiring or serving residents of the Opportunity Zones or
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

IMPROVED OVERSIGHT NEEDED, supra note 10, at 9.
Eastman & Kaeding, supra note 50, at 8.
Marcin, supra note 104, at 107.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 108.
COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, supra note 59, at 15.
Id. at 4.
Id.
Id. at 20.
Id.
COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, supra note 59, at 20 fig.8.
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are instead interested in building Ritz-Carlton hotels is unclear without further
information.
The lack of valuable data raises two questions critical for OZ success: What
data should be collected to measure OZ success, and who should oversee
collecting and reporting it? To decide these questions, it may first be helpful to
demonstrate why collecting data for place-based incentives can be tricky, and
then examine the oversight in place with other place-based incentives.
B.

Other Tax Expenditure Programs Collect and Report Data

Place-based incentives are harder to evaluate than other tax expenditures
because benefits are distributed to investors and not directly to low-income
taxpayers. For comparison, consider the research done on the effect of Earned
Income Tax Credits (“EITCs”). 122 These refundable tax credits are distributed
directly to low to moderate-income taxpayers, and researchers can use
information directly from tax records to measure the credits’ impact. For
instance, researchers analyzing IRS records found significant increases in
student test scores amongst families claiming the credit and have also found that
EITCs have been able to lift millions out of poverty, help children go to college,
and boost the employment of single mothers. 123 Such data has confirmed the
effectiveness of the program, and the program has received bipartisan support. 124
Since tax benefits for OZs do not go directly to low-income individuals and
families, information filed by QOFs on tax forms 4996 and 4997 and by
investors on form 8989 are not as helpful for evaluating impact on individuals
living within Opportunity Zones. Thus, QOFs must collect and report
information beyond that required on current tax forms. Further, because the IRS
has been reluctant to expand its role beyond monitoring taxpayer compliance,
another governmental body will need to take responsibility for collecting and
monitoring data from QOFs.
Despite their shortcomings, older place-based incentives have attempted to
monitor data relevant to their stated welfare goals. For New Markets Tax
Credits, CDEs are required to have a “primary mission of serving low-income
communities” and are required to have at least twenty percent of their governing
boards staffed by members of the local community. 125 Additionally, the CDFI
122. Chuck Marr et al., EITC and Child Tax Credit Promote Work, Reduce Poverty, and
Support Children’s Development, Research Finds, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y, at 1 (Oct. 1, 2015),
https://www.cbpp.org/research/federal-tax/eitc-and-child-tax-credit-promote-work-reducepoverty-and-support-childrens, at 1.
123. Id. at 1–2.
124. EITC Attracts Bipartisan Praise and Proposals, COMM. FOR RESPONSIBLE FED. BUDGET,
http://www.crfb.org/blogs/eitc-attracts-bipartisan-praise-and-proposals (last updated Mar. 11,
2014).
125. Chad Qian, An Overview of the New Markets Tax Credit, TAX FOUND. (July 8, 2019),
https://taxfoundation.org/new-markets-tax-credit-nmtc/.
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Fund evaluates CDE applications based upon four criteria: business strategy,
capitalization strategy, management strategy, and community impact. 126 This
fund also collects data to evaluate economic and societal outcomes. 127 This type
of data includes number of jobs by type, numbers of rental and for-sale housing
units, and the capacity of educational, child care, and health care facilities. 128
While the IRS administers the tax compliance aspects of the NMTC, the CDFI
Fund administers the policy goals of the program to ensure it meets its mission
to expand economic opportunity for those who need it. 129 Even with these
requirements, however, empirical evidence on the impact of NMTCs is
limited, 130 and evaluations of this program have suffered at times due to
inconsistent and incomplete reporting from the CDEs. 131
Meanwhile, the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit has direct oversight from
the IRS, while state and local housing finance agencies (“HFAs”) are responsible
for administration. 132 The Department of Housing and Urban Development
(“HUD”) collects both mandatory and voluntary data on LIHTCs. 133 In the
Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Congress required state HFAs to
furnish to the HUD information regarding the race, ethnicity, family
composition, age, income, use of rental assistance, disability status, and monthly
rental payments of households residing in each property receiving LIHTCs. 134
The HUD also voluntarily collects project-level data and has sponsored studies
of the LIHTC program. 135 The Government Accountability Office (“GAO”)
issued a report in 2015, however, stating the HUD’s data collection could be
improved, as its data on the number and location of LIHTC projects is limited. 136
Furthermore, the agency has not established performance metrics to measure its
priority goal of maintaining and expanding affordable housing to “build strong
resilient and inclusive communities.” 137
What is worrisome is that, rather than improve upon these two place-based
tax incentives, Opportunity Zones have the least reporting requirements of the
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Jordan, supra note 81, at 77.
IMPROVED OVERSIGHT NEEDED, supra note 10, at 16.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 14.
Qian, supra note 125.
U.S. GOV. ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-14-500, NEW MARKET TAX CREDIT: BETTER
CONTROLS AND DATA ARE NEEDED TO ENSURE EFFECTIVENESS 20 (2014) [hereinafter BETTER
CONTROLS AND DATA].
132. CONG. RSCH. SERV., THE LOW-INCOME HOUSING TAX CREDIT: POLICY ISSUES (2019).
133. U.S. GOV. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-330, JOINT IRS-HUD ADMINISTRATION
COULD HELP ADDRESS WEAKNESSES IN OVERSIGHT 6 (2015) [hereinafter JOINT IRS-HUD
ADMINISTRATION].
134. Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 § 36(a), 42 U.S.C. § 1437z-8 (2008).
135. JOINT IRS-HUD ADMINISTRATION, supra note 133, at 23.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 23–24.
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three. The IRS alone administers Opportunity Zones, and does not monitor
performance of these zones in any way beyond statutory compliance. 138
Congress did not create any sort of program to help monitor Opportunity Zones,
as they did with NMTCs by creating the CDFI Fund. 139 Further, OZ
administration is not assisted by other existing governmental bodies, as LIHTCs
are with data collection from the HUD. 140 Without a formal application process,
QOFs are not required to state—or even possess—any goals related to
benefitting low-income individuals living within Opportunity Zones.
Interestingly, Senators Cory Booker and Tim Scott included reporting
requirements for Opportunity Zones in the original draft of IIOA. 141 The bill
required the Treasury Department to collect data on the number of funds created,
and their impact on underserved communities. 142 Both senators recognized how
important reporting requirements are to measuring the impact of the program on
job creation, poverty reduction, and support for new businesses. 143 However,
these requirements were dropped from the final provision passed in the Tax Cuts
and Jobs Act. 144
C. The Treasury Alone Cannot Collect & Evaluate Data
Even if Opportunity Zones were required to report data on the social benefit
of the program, a governmental body would need to oversee receiving the data,
standardizing it, and making it available for public analysis. Both political
parties have suggested that the Treasury play a bigger role in OZ data collection,
but it is unclear how the Treasury will do so. 145 House Majority Whip Clyburn
introduced a bill in 2019 that would require the Secretary of the Treasury to
collect and make publicly available a list of investment vehicles certified as
QOFs. 146 The bill would also require the Comptroller General, head of the GAO,
to submit to Congress a report on the effectiveness of program policies,
including potential indicators for measuring social benefit such as employment
rates and new business start-ups. 147 Unfortunately, the bill does not explain how
the Treasury Department and GAO would find such information. In a report

138. IMPROVED OVERSIGHT NEEDED, supra note 10, at 13.
139. Id. at 12.
140. Id. at 11–12.
141. S. 293, 115th Cong. § 2(c) (1st Sess. 2017).
142. Id.
143. Press Release, Sen. Cory Booker, Booker, Scott, Hassan, Young Introduce Bipartisan Bill
to Strengthen Reporting Requirements for Opportunity Zone Tax Incentive (May 8, 2019),
https://www.booker.senate.gov/news/press/booker-scott-hassan-young-introduce-bipartisan-billto-strengthen-reporting-requirements-for-opportunity-zone-tax-incentive.
144. Id.
145. IMPROVED OVERSIGHT NEEDED, supra note 10, at 17.
146. H.R. 5042, 116th Cong. §6 (1st Sess. 2019).
147. Id.
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published in October of 2020, the GAO found that data useful for evaluating
social benefits of OZs simply isn’t being collected anywhere. 148
Meanwhile, Senators Cory Booker and Tim Scott introduced a bill in 2019
that would reintroduce the reporting requirements taken out of their original
IIOA bill. 149 Their bill would require the Treasury Department to collect data on
“the impacts and outcomes of zone designation,” which might include
employment metrics, poverty rates, “and other metrics as determined by the
Secretary.” 150 Like House Majority Whip Clyburn’s bill, however, this bill fails
to acknowledge how the Treasury would collect such information.
Even if useful data for measuring social benefit were reported by QOFs, the
Department of Treasury would still need help from another governmental body
to appropriately manage this data. 151 Unfortunately, the governmental bodies
assisting other place-based tax incentives may not be suitable for OZs. Officials
from the Department of Treasury reported that they do not have legal authority
to redirect CDFI Fund appropriations to collect OZ data, 152 and furthermore,
CDFI fund managers have found that the OZ tax incentive is “not a good match”
for CDFI investments. 153 Although the HUD has taken responsibility for
launching the Opportunity Zones website, it may not be the best candidate to
take on data collection duties, given the difficulty it has had monitoring the
LIHTC program. As will be discussed, the best approach towards collecting OZ
data requires expertise and support from multiple governmental bodies.
IV. SOLUTIONS
A.

Establish Mandatory Reporting Requirements

Tracking whether Opportunity Zones are benefitting inhabitants of
distressed communities will require a robust amount of data. Given that OZ
investments can be made in a wide variety of industries, the kind of data that
will best measure success may vary. Additionally, because OZs do not directly
target individuals living within their tracts, measuring success can be complex,
and relying on one or a few data points to measure growth may be misleading.
For instance, an increase in property value in an OZ may show an increase of

148. IMPROVED OVERSIGHT NEEDED, supra note 10, at 16.
149. S. 1344, 116th Cong. §1 (1st Sess. 2019); Booker, supra note 143.
150. S. 1344, 116th Cong. §1 (1st Sess. 2019).
151. IMPROVED OVERSIGHT NEEDED, supra note 10, at 14.
152. Id. at 13.
153. Can Opportunity Zones Address Concerns in the Small Business Economy?: Hearing
Before the Committee On Small Business’ Subcommittee on Economic Growth, Tax, and Capital
Access (2019) (Statement of Jennifer Vasiloff, Chief External Affairs Officer, Opportunity Finance
Network).
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wealth within that community, or may reflect a pricing out of poorer individuals,
and displacement associated with gentrification. 154
Fortunately, the federal government has already identified a reporting
framework where QOFs would collect extensive data useful for measuring social
benefit. In 2018, the White House created the White House Opportunity and
Revitalization Council (“the Council”) to explore ways in which federal
agencies can partner with OZ investors and provide social services necessary to
support community revitalization. 155 The Council was composed of a vast
number of different federal departments, including the HUD, the Treasury, the
Department of Justice, the Department of Commerce, the Department of Labor,
and several more. 156
In 2020, the Council issued a best practices memo to President Trump. 157 In
the memo, the Council identified a voluntary reporting framework constructed
by the U.S. Impact Investing Alliance and the Beeck Center for Social Impact
and Innovation at Georgetown University, named the Opportunity Zones
Reporting Framework (hereinafter, “Framework”). 158 The Framework
emphasizes the importance of community engagement and impact, and calls for
reporting data in a standardized fashion that allows regional and national
aggregation. 159
In this framework, QOFs would first offer information regarding their
community engagement goals, 160 like the report CDEs give to the CDFI Fund
when applying for NMTCs. QOFs would craft a mission statement or impact
objective for their business and state their intended investment focus. 161 The
Framework would then encourage QOFs to collect and report data relating to
their impact objective and their goals. 162 To aggregate data effectively, the
Framework suggests that all QOFs use consistent, standardized data to help
measure performance and impact on communities. 163
154. Pro-Gentrification Origins, supra note 8, at 766.
155. Eastman & Kaeding, supra note 50, at 10; WHITE HOUSE OPPORTUNITY &
REVITALIZATION COUNCIL, OPPORTUNITY NOW, https://opportunityzones.hud.gov/thecouncil
(last visited Dec. 30, 2020) [hereinafter OPPORTUNITY NOW].
156. OPPORTUNITY NOW, supra note 155.
157. WHITE HOUSE OPPORTUNITY & REVITALIZATION COUNCIL: OPPORTUNITY ZONES BEST
PRACTICES REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 4 (2020).
158. Id. at 8.
159. U.S. IMPACT INVESTING ALL., BEECK CTR. AT GEO. UNIV. & FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y.,
PRIORITIZING AND ACHIEVING IMPACT IN OPPORTUNITY ZONES 2–3 (2019), https://static1.square
space.com/static/5c5484d70b77bd4a9a0e8c34/t/5d1144358bc6b10001a5af3f/1561412661497/Op
portunity+Zones+Reporting+Framework+-+June+2019.pdf [hereinafter PRIORITIZING AND
ACHIEVING IMPACT IN OPPORTUNITY ZONES].
160. Id. at 3.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 2.
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The type of data that would be standardized would include basic data such
as the size and structure of the fund, what type of investors held an interest in
the fund, and where these investors resided. 164 The QOFs would then report
standardized information on each of their business investments, including the
number of employees in the business, the number of employees from low to midincome communities, new jobs created by the business, and the number of
employees from low-income communities and other disadvantaged groups. 165
To help easily identify the types of investments made by QOFs, the
Framework also advocates for QOFs to identify the appropriate North American
Industry Classification System (“NAICS”) code for their investments. 166 NAICS
is used primarily as an industry classification system that collects, tabulates, and
analyzes data of businesses within the U.S. economy. 167 It categorizes different
business industries using two to six number digits depending on the industry. 168
Though NAICS is primarily used for statistical analysis, it has also been used
for other purposes, including by state governments offering tax incentives to
businesses classified in specific NAICS industries. 169
The Framework also suggests collecting “transaction-level” data applicable
to the specific investment to measure social benefit. 170 To do so, QOFs would
need to determine what data would be relevant to measuring community impact
within their specific industry. 171 For example, a real estate QOF might report
total square footage of the real estate project, and whether the building under
construction is commercial or residential. 172 The QOF would further report how
many affordable units have been created or renovated, as well as the percentage
of units within the complex that are affordable units. 173
Standardizing reporting requirements would help provide meaningful data
regarding Opportunity Zones’ impact on local communities and would help
avoid the issue of inconsistent data faced by the NMTC and LIHTC programs.
Establishing common reporting criteria might help researchers better compare
QOFs in different QOZs and in different industries. Further, requiring QOFs to
use NAICS codes to identify their specific industry might prevent QOFs from
using vague terms such as “Pooled Investment Fund” to describe their
investments.
164. PRIORITIZING AND ACHIEVING IMPACT IN OPPORTUNITY ZONES, supra note 159, at 3.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 4.
167. Frequently Asked Questions, N. AM. INDUS. CLASSIFICATION SYS., https://www.census
.gov/eos/www/naics/faqs/faqs.html#q1 (last visited Feb. 21, 2021).
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. PRIORITIZING AND ACHIEVING IMPACT IN OPPORTUNITY ZONES, supra note 159, at 3.
171. Id. at 4.
172. Id.
173. Id.
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Beyond collecting standardized data for all QOFs, collecting industryspecific data is also crucial, given that QOFs can invest in almost any industry.
If QOFs are required to use a NAICS code for classifying their investments,
NAICS codes could be paired with industry-specific metrics that those QOFs
would need to collect and track. For instance, if the NAICS code for real estate
projects is 53, 174 all QOZ real estate investments would classify under 53. Thus,
any QOZ investment classifying under 53 would then have to report additional
data relating to the real estate industry, such as whether the investment is
commercial or residential, and the number of affordable units rented. 175
Ensuring that QOFs of the same industry are tracking and reporting the same
types of data simplifies comparing and analyzing these QOFs.
Given the abundance of skepticism around Opportunity Zones, and the
complexity of the program, Congress should amend the Code to make a
reporting schedule like the Framework a requirement rather than a
recommendation. The entire Framework is expansive and requiring QOFs to
follow all its suggestions may not be necessary. However, at a minimum, QOFs
should be required to identify the industries they are invested in, establish a
social benefit they wish to provide to individuals in QOZs, and collect
standardized, industry specific data to measure that benefit. When considering
the cost of the OZ program—the Joint Committee on Taxation estimates that
Qualified Opportunity Zones from 2020–2024 represent an $8.2 billion tax
expenditure 176—requiring QOFs to provide some information regarding their
activities seems like a reasonable request. Were the QOFs required to report this
information, the next step would be identifying where this information should
be reported to, given the IRS’s hesitance to get involved.
B.

Re-establish the White House Opportunity & Revitalization Council

Up until the inauguration of President Joe Biden, there was a council in place
that could solve this problem. In fact, it was the very same council that
recommended the Framework: the White House Opportunity and Revitalization
Council. The Council was chaired by the Secretary of the HUD, and its members
included the Assistant to the President for Domestic Policy, the Secretary of the
Treasury, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Education, the Secretary of
Agriculture, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the Secretary of

174. EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET, NORTH AMERICAN
INDUSTRY CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM 61 (2017), https://www.census.gov/naics/reference_files
_tools/2017_NAICS_Manual.pdf.
175. PRIORITIZING AND ACHIEVING IMPACT IN OPPORTUNITY ZONES, supra note 159, at 4.
176. JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL
YEARS 2020–2024 30 (2020), https://www.jct.gov/publications/2020/jcx-23-20/ [hereinafter
ESTIMATES].
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Labor, and many other leaders across government agencies. 177 Further, as part
of their duties, the Secretary of HUD and other Council members engaged in
extensive conversations and meetings with community leaders. 178 The Council’s
“main goals” included assessing actions that each agency could take to focus
federal investments on, and to stimulate economic development of, urban and
economically distressed communities, including QOZs. 179
Taking charge of collecting and analyzing data reported by QOFs regarding
their impact on low-income communities would meet this goal head on. In fact,
this was a part of the original mission of the Council, as the Executive Order that
established the Council charged it with “evaluating what data, metrics, and
methodologies [could] be used to measure the effectiveness of public and private
investments.” 180 Further, the Council planned to help Congress “develop
legislation that will address the collection of any additional information that
would be useful in assessing the value of the Opportunity Zones incentive to
distressed communities.” 181 The Council, supported by members from multiple
federal agencies, was well equipped to take on the difficult project of collecting
and understanding data from QOFs, which can invest in real estate, technology,
health care, and almost any other industry.
In fact, the Council could help develop industry-specific standards that
would measure whether the QOF investment was benefitting those living in the
Opportunity Zone. These industry-specific standards might then be assigned to
a NAICS code to standardize the data. For instance, if the Council found that
social benefit provided by real estate businesses was best captured by measuring
affordable housing units created, the Council could recommend passing
legislation requiring that QOFs invested in real estate projects report this metric.
All QOF investments filing under the NAICS real estate code would then be
required to collect this additional, industry-specific data, and report that data to
the Council.
The challenge the Council would face from here is how to handle and
analyze this data. Certainly, collecting the data will not automatically lead to
complete transparency and clear reporting. The Council would have to decide
how QOFs should report this data, how the Council would store this data, and to
what extent this data could and should be made publicly available. Additionally,
since this approach would require QOFs to report key metrics, there would need
to be a system in place to audit QOF reporting.

177. WHITE HOUSE OPPORTUNITY & REVITALIZATION COUNCIL: REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT
9 (2019).
178. Id.
179. Id. at 10.
180. Id. at 132.
181. Id. at 131.
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Unfortunately, the White House Opportunity and Revitalization Council
terminated on January 21, 2021. 182 It is therefore imperative that President
Biden’s administration re-establish the Council. If Opportunity Zones are to
remain in the Code, there must be a system in place to measure whether the tax
provision is helping communities suffering from the “deeply uneven” recovery,
as Senator Scott, Kevin Hassett, and Sean Parker all hoped it would do.
Given there is almost no information collected to measure social benefit,
this proposed solution represents the first step towards solving the problem in
monitoring Opportunity Zones. Rather than relying on limited IRS and Census
data, this proposal will make QOFs responsible for reporting firsthand how their
investments are impacting local communities. An $8.2 billion tax
expenditure 183—and, more importantly, the great number of communities stuck
in economic hardship—demand a program that works as its supporters promised
it would. Collecting valuable data to measure social benefit will help an honest
evaluation of OZs finally begin.
CONCLUSION
The recent bipartisan support of Opportunity Zones suggests that this
program and other place-based tax incentives will not disappear anytime soon.
Without a valuable means of evaluating OZs, debates will persist over the
effectiveness of this program and other place-based incentives. Meanwhile,
there is a real danger that OZs are failing to improve the lives of people in lowincome communities, and instead are working primarily to the benefit of wealthy
investors. Thus, it is imperative that QOFs report standardized, industry-specific
data to an agency equipped to handle it. Implementing objective data will help
remove biases from both proponents and skeptics, and finally shed light on
whether Opportunity Zones can “create a spark” in struggling communities and
help improve the lives of those living in them.
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